

International Aspects of Democratization: The Case of Spain

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Introduction

Given the abundance of literature on Spain's transition to democracy, it is remarkable how little attention has been paid to the international dimension of this process.¹ By and large, authors writing on Spain appear to have accepted Schmitter's view that 'transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy [are] largely to be explained by national forces and calculations', and that 'external actors [tend] to play an indirect and usually marginal role, with the obvious exception of those instances in which a foreign occupying power was present'. While accepting the first half of this statement, this chapter will explore the relationships linking domestic and external actors in Spain during the period of pre-transition (1969–75) and transition proper (1975–8), which have hitherto received scant attention. Additionally, it will attempt to provide answers derived from the Spanish experience to some of the questions raised by Whitehead in his *International Aspects of Democratization* concerning matters such as the 'promotion of democracy' as a foreign policy objective, the nature of the instruments available to those pursuing such a goal, and the ability of domestic actors to benefit from it.²

As had already happened during Spain's first transition from dictatorship to democracy in the early 1930s, in the mid-1970s rapid political change took place at a time of international economic crisis. After benefiting from over a decade of sustained European growth, the Spanish economy, always heavily dependent on imported oil for its energy, was severely hit by the sudden increase in prices in 1973–4, and entered a period of stagflation. Some authors have

argued that this crisis contributed to democratization by undermining confidence in a regime which had staked much of its prestige on the socio-economic achievements of the previous decade. Contemporary opinion polls, however, suggest that the Spanish public did not attribute this severe economic crisis to the government, but rather to factors beyond its control. Nevertheless, the widespread labour unrest which accompanied the crisis may have contributed to underlining the regime's inability to provide answers to the nation's most pressing problems.³

Be this as it may, successive transition governments postponed economic adjustment to the oil shock and the ensuing crisis until the Moncloa Pacts of 1977, largely out of fear of upsetting an already delicate balance. Although this delay was to prove extremely damaging in economic terms, leaving Spain unprepared for the second oil crisis of 1979, in the short term it undoubtedly eased the transition process. According to one author, it was Spain's high level of reserves and general credit-worthiness, and indeed the attitude of the international finance community as a whole, which allowed it to overcome circumstances not unlike those which had contributed to the collapse of the Second Republic in the 1930s.⁴

The international political climate of the mid-1970s was undoubtedly more favourable to democratization than it had been in the 1930s. Above all, by 1975 Spain's major neighbours and partners were democratically governed, and regarded its authoritarian regime as an anachronistic relic of the inter-war years. Additionally, the early stages of the transition coincided with a thaw in the Cold War still being waged by the superpowers, a phase marked by the Ford-Brezhnev summit meeting at Vladivostok in late 1974, and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in the summer of 1975.

The Cold War

Spain had effectively taken sides in the Cold War in 1953, when it signed its crucial bilateral agreement with the United States, whereby the latter provided military and economic aid in return for the use of military bases. This agreement, which effectively integrated Spain in to the Western defence system, was subsequently renewed in 1963, 1970, and 1976. The United States had favoured Spanish membership of NATO ever since its creation, but had invariably stumbled on Scandinavian, Dutch, and British opposition to Franco's authoritarian regime, notwithstanding the fact that the similarly dictatorial Salazar had been a founding member of the Alliance.

In the early 1970s, developments in Spain's vicinity contributed to augmenting her already considerable geo-strategic importance to the West. Above all, the world economic crisis triggered by the 1973-4 oil shock increased the strategic value of the Straits of Gibraltar, since most Middle East oil reached Western Europe and the USA via the Mediterranean. In October 1973 the Yom Kippur war underlined the importance of the Spanish bases, even though the Franco government, anxious not to antagonize its Arab allies, forced US aircraft in transit to Israel to refuel in the air. Shortly afterwards, the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship following the military coup of 25 April 1974 seriously threatened to undermine NATO's southern flank, prompting the United States to press for Spanish membership with renewed vigour. Several months later, at the other end of the Mediterranean, the Cypriot crisis resulted in the departure of the Greek Colonels, who were succeeded by a government which saw in NATO a symbol of US support for the military junta. What was more, the conflict over Cyprus led the USA to impose an arms embargo on the Turks, who in turn threatened to seek Soviet support. Finally, throughout this period, the French and Italian Communist parties steadily improved their electoral performance, to the extent that many in the West expected them to participate in future coalition governments.

The most important of these events, in terms of its impact on the domestic political situation in Spain, was undoubtedly the Portuguese Revolution.⁵ One unexpected by-product of the revolution was the creation in Spain of the Unión Militar Democrática (UMD), a clandestine organization consisting of several hundred young officers dedicated to the establishment of a democratic system of government and the political independence of the armed forces. The UMD did not aim to emulate the Portuguese MFA (which provided them with considerable support), but rather to prevent the more reactionary sectors of the Spanish military from intervening against a civilian uprising against the regime. The UMD grew rapidly in 1974-5, but collapsed when its leaders were court-martialled and expelled from the armed forces in 1976. In spite of their failure, the discovery that not even the military were immune to contagion from the democratic virus provided reformists within the regime with fresh evidence of the need to find a new institutional role for the armed forces, something which could best be achieved in the context of a constitutional democracy.

The Left opposition naturally read Caetano's failure to perpetuate the Salazar dictatorship beyond his retirement as evidence that something similar could be expected in Spain after Franco's death.

More specifically, the Communist Party (PCE) initially believed that events in Portugal vindicated its own efforts to attain a broad-based, cross-class 'pact for freedom', but the Portuguese Communist Party's subsequent attempt to seize power by non-democratic means (which the Spanish Party hastened to condemn) undermined its case somewhat. In marked contrast, the far smaller, recently renovated Socialist Party (PSOE) concluded that decades of clandestine struggle against a dictatorship did not guarantee electoral success, and that, with sufficient external support, a relatively new party could soon challenge better-established rivals.⁶

Reformists within the regime who had become increasingly outspoken in demand of constitutional reforms which might pave the way for more substantial changes after Franco's death also felt vindicated by events in Portugal. These sectors had repeatedly warned that Prime Minister Carrero Blanco's refusal to contemplate such measures could only lead to a violent outburst from below, and they consequently stepped up the pressure on his successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, though to little avail. Most importantly, the Portuguese Revolution taught the reformists that, after decades of right-wing authoritarianism, political parties capable of representing the more moderate, even conservative, sectors of society could not be improvised overnight.⁷

Finally, the events in Portugal appear to have had a significant impact on Juan Carlos, who had been waiting in the wings since his appointment as Franco's successor in 1969. The Prince had spent part of his childhood in exile near Lisbon, and, unusually for a Spaniard, spoke Portuguese and knew the country well. Juan Carlos was personally involved in assisting prominent Portuguese financiers and industrialists who fled the country in the aftermath of the coup, an experience which appears to have strengthened his resolve to carry out the necessary reforms to prevent something similar occurring in Spain.⁸

Events in Portugal were also important in that they influenced the major external actors' perceptions of Spain's immediate prospects. The threat of a Communist take-over in Portugal initially led the US administration, and particularly Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State in 1973-6, to view further political change in the Iberian Peninsula with deep apprehension. Paradoxically, by late 1975 the Portuguese experience had discouraged the USSR from becoming entangled in Spain. Most importantly of all, the success of the German-led intervention in Portugal, aimed at defeating Communist efforts to take power while strengthening Soares's PSP,

proved that even a situation which seemed lost could be turned around to the West's advantage.⁹

Kissinger has claimed that 'America's contribution to Spain's evolution during the 1970s has been one of the major achievements of our foreign policy.' However, Wells Stabler, US Ambassador in Madrid from 1975 to 1978, is of the opinion that 'one might have supposed that . . . the United States would have developed some form of policy toward the future of Spain, already having some idea of what the dynamics were . . . but the fact is that the United States really didn't do a great deal'. On the whole, US governments adopted a largely passive attitude, while endorsing the democratizing process in as far as it proved compatible with the existing balance of power in southern Europe, and in particular, with their continued access to Spanish military bases.¹⁰

Given its excellent relations with the Franco regime, we should first ask ourselves whether the US had any substantive interest in a change of regime. On the one hand, it was reasonable to expect future democratic governments to become increasingly demanding when it came to renewing the crucial bases treaty, as indeed was to be the case. A democratic Spain, however, would finally be free to join NATO, thereby strengthening the southern flank which so obsessed Kissinger. Equally, a democratic Spain would also be able to join the European Community, something the US had advocated even against its own economic self-interest, on the grounds that it would anchor the country permanently in the Western camp. As one senior US diplomat serving in Spain in 1974-8 observed, in theory 'the security relationship itself [would] be more soundly based for the long term if founded on a democratic consensus than if derived from the will of one man'.¹¹

In Kissinger's view, during the final years of the Franco regime, the US administration had been faced with the choice of having to 'ostracize and oppose the existing regime or, while working with it, to extend our contacts and therefore our influence for the post-Franco period'; it opted for the latter course of action. President Nixon undoubtedly showed some concern for the Spanish situation during his mandate, particularly after his visit to Madrid in late 1970, at a time when, in Kissinger's words, 'the post-Franco transition was a subject too delicate for even the most oblique allusion'. Nixon concluded that he should support Prince Juan Carlos, and invited him to Washington in early 1971. Shortly afterwards, he sent the deputy head of the CIA, Vernon Walters, on a secret fact-finding mission to Spain, which included an interview with Franco.

In spite of the latter's efforts to reassure Walters that existing arrangements would guarantee a peaceful transition to a somewhat more democratic monarchy after his death, the US administration remained uneasy about the future.¹³

The Secretary of State's high opinion of the US's ability to cultivate 'moderate elements in Spanish government and society' was largely unjustified, however. Indeed Washington was barely in touch with even the most moderate sectors of the democratic opposition until shortly before Franco's death. In May 1970, for example, the US Embassy in Madrid acted in collusion with the Spanish government in preventing a delegation of moderate opposition leaders from presenting Secretary of State William Rogers with a document opposing the renewal of the bases treaty. In 1974 a deputy assistant secretary travelled to Madrid to meet a handful of moderate opposition leaders, prompting a furious response from the authorities. A year later the newly appointed US Ambassador, Stabler, arranged a meeting between moderate opposition leaders and President Gerald Ford, but later cancelled it at the request of the Spanish government. In spite of this, Stabler gradually established contact with leaders of the non-Communist opposition—including the socialist leader Felipe González—in the course of 1975–6. Even though the Communist Party was the largest and most well-organized opposition group, the US administration refused to have any dealings with it, as a delegation from the Communist-led *Junta Democrática* platform discovered on visiting Washington in mid-1975.¹³

As both Kissinger and Stabler have acknowledged, on the eve of Franco's death the top priority for the US administration was not democratization, but rather the renewal of the bases agreement, which was due to expire in 1975. This determination to secure a military presence in Spain at any price caused concern and dismay in some West European capitals. In May 1975 German chancellor Helmut Schmidt reminded President Ford that the Franco era was obviously coming to an end, in view of which 'we should be encouraging those we hope will govern after Franco; that means we must deal not only with those who are in power now'. Ford objected that the renewal of the bases agreement was of vital interest to the West, to which Schmidt replied that 'so that you can be sure of your bases and your special strategic ties with Spain beyond today, you should talk about it with tomorrow's rulers as well'. Ford ignored this advice, however, and in October 1975, at the height of a major international campaign against the regime triggered by the execution of five anti-Franco activists, the US signed a pre-agreement for the renewal of the lease on the bases.¹⁴

Kissinger initially behaved as though Franco's death in November 1975 and Juan Carlos's proclamation as King of Spain had no direct bearing on US–Spanish relations, but the new authorities in Madrid thought otherwise. Although Juan Carlos inherited a prime minister, Arias Navarro, who was lukewarm about undertaking substantial reforms, his new foreign minister, José María de Areilza, was firmly committed to the establishment of a Western-style parliamentary monarchy. The latter immediately insisted on elevating the US–Spanish agreement to the status of a treaty, which required the approval of the US Senate, a body traditionally hostile to the Franco regime. Areilza thereby hoped to underline US recognition of the fact that it was no longer dealing with an authoritarian regime, but with a future democracy. The new Treaty was duly signed in January 1976, paving the way for Juan Carlos's visit to Washington in June, in the course of which he openly committed himself to a Western-style democracy in a speech to the US Congress.¹⁵

In spite of this explicit support for the young monarch, Kissinger remained highly sceptical as to the short-term prospects for democracy in Spain, and resented West European pressure in favour of democratization. In particular, as Areilza soon realized, the Secretary of State was unenthusiastic about the legalization of the Communist Party, an issue which would soon dominate the domestic political debate. Responding to claims that the US had vetoed Communist participation, in June 1976 the State Department declared that, while this was a purely internal affair, 'in our judgement it would be absurd to make legalization of a party dedicated to authoritarian principles a litmus test as to whether or not democratization is taking place'. This statement failed to convince many observers, notably the Communists themselves, who hastened to declare that they would not object to a democratically elected government applying for NATO membership.¹⁶

The Carter Administration, which took office in late 1976, appears to have adopted a somewhat more pragmatic stance towards Communism in Western Europe generally, an attitude which may have tempered earlier opposition to the legalization of the PCE. In early 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance defended legalization on the grounds that 'icebergs are more dangerous when they are submerged', though he was still in favour of excluding the Communists from the first elections. Adolfo Suárez nevertheless legalized the PCE in April 1977, on the eve of his first visit to the US, during which he was treated somewhat coldly by the Carter Administration. Ambassador Stabler would later reflect that 'if we took the

view that we supported Spanish democracy, then we ought to have followed through so that people involved believed we supported them'.¹⁷

The Soviet Union played a far less prominent role in the Spanish process than the United States. The USSR had come to accept Spanish membership of the Western bloc, and although the Franco regime had refused to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow, the early 1970s witnessed a marked improvement in commercial relations. In Portugal the Soviets had lent substantial support to the Communists in the hope that domestic turmoil would lead to the independence of the African colonies and a significant shift in the regional balance of power at the expense of the West. Spain offered no comparable possibilities, since the USA and France had already indicated their support for Moroccan ambitions in the former Spanish Sahara. Additionally, Soviet involvement in Portugal had briefly threatened to jeopardize *détente*, and the USSR was unwilling to risk irritating the West further with renewed incursions in the Iberian Peninsula.

Contrary to what decades of anti-Francoist rhetoric might suggest, the existence of an authoritarian regime in Spain had suited the Soviets well, in spite of the bases agreement with the USA. Precisely so as to compensate for the latter, in the 1960s Spanish foreign-policy-makers had displayed a strong independent streak, notably in relation to Latin America (including Castro's Cuba) and the Arab world, thereby irritating the West. Democratization was expected to pave the way for Spanish integration into the EC and NATO, which Moscow paradoxically equated with an increase in US influence in Western Europe. Seen in this light, the USSR had little to gain from a successful transition to democracy in Spain, except the establishment of full diplomatic relations, and hence the improvement of commercial ones.

In marked contrast with the Portuguese case, Soviet involvement in Spain was also limited by the absence of a powerful domestic ally. The PCE had become increasingly critical of the USSR since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and was anxious to distance itself from Soviet foreign policy. In 1974 the PCE strongly opposed the Portuguese Communists' attempt to take power by non-democratic means, and read Moscow's support for Cunhal as evidence of Soviet determination to undermine Spanish efforts to build a broad, democratic anti-Franco alliance. Relations deteriorated further after the conference of European Communist parties held in East Berlin in mid-1976, at which Secretary General Santiago Carrillo announced he would never take part in another

such gathering. Given this increasingly independent stance, and Carrillo's efforts to influence other Communist parties in a similar direction, the Soviets may have come to contemplate the PCE's legalization and possible electoral success with some trepidation. Significantly, Moscow established full diplomatic relations with Spain in February 1977, at a time when there was still uncertainty as to the PCE's legalization.¹⁸

Even if relations had been more cordial, the Soviets had reason to doubt whether the PCE would be an efficient obstacle to US influence in Spain. Already in 1974 the party's Eurocommunist policies had led it to acknowledge the impossibility of dismantling US bases in Spain as long as the USSR kept a presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the PCE remained hostile to Spanish membership of NATO, as we saw above, by mid-1976 it was willing to accept a democratically adopted decision to join. Furthermore, since the late 1960s, the PCE had been firmly committed to the cause of European integration.¹⁹

The European Community

On the eve of Franco's death, the consensus amongst leading West European powers concerning Spain's immediate future was qualitatively different to that predominant in the United States. Broadly speaking, while for the latter Spain's future was primarily a defence and security issue, for the former it was essentially a political one. This discrepancy reflects fundamentally different attitudes towards the promotion of democracy generally, which Whitehead has attributed to their contrasting histories, their distinctive geopolitical roles, and their differences of political structure.²⁰ In practice, it resulted in a much more assertive role being played by leading West European governments, notably that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Unlike Kissinger, Chancellor Schmidt and his leading West European partners thought that 'the chances were particularly good for a shift to democracy in Spain', and tended to act accordingly.²¹

It should nevertheless be remembered that, in spite of their post-war hostility to the Franco regime, the leading West European nations had gradually established a reasonable working relationship with Spain. The opening-up of Spain's economy in the late 1950s took place with the full acquiescence of all OECD countries, not just the United States, and the economic miracle of 1960-73 would not have occurred if Western Europe had not supplied direct

capital investment, tourists, and jobs for Spanish emigrants in abundance. France and Germany in particular appear to have encouraged Spain's economic development—and closer ties with Europe—in the hope that this would eventually create conditions conducive to the restoration of democracy, an attitude which was of course fully compatible with their own economic self-interest.

It could also be argued that thanks to the US–Spanish bases agreement of 1953, the European democracies had benefited from Franco's indirect contribution to Western defence without having to offer anything in return. One possible exception to this was France, which obtained its own limited military agreement on 1970, with a Spanish government determined to show the USA that it had allies elsewhere.

In spite of these growing links, Franco's Spain failed to overcome its pariah status. This situation was somewhat alleviated by Juan Carlos's appointment as Franco's successor in 1969, which allowed West European governments to cultivate him, thereby appearing to bolster the Franco regime. The prince made his first official visit to France in 1970, and to Germany in 1973. Other European states, notably the Scandinavians, did not invite him until after the restoration of democracy.

The leading West European governments also expressed their commitment to democratic change by becoming increasingly outspoken in their support for the domestic opposition. The latter's contacts abroad gradually raised the cost of repression for the regime, thereby providing them with a degree of protection, if not immunity. Indeed the semi-toleration of the moderate opposition so characteristic of the early 1970s was partly the consequence of the proliferation of external links. The contrast between US and European attitudes is particularly striking in this respect. The same Spanish government which prevented Secretary of State Rogers from meeting a group of opposition leaders in May 1970 had acceded to German foreign minister Walter Scheel's request for a similar interview in April. This type of discrepancy did not go unnoticed by the domestic opposition.²²

Governmental willingness to intervene in support of opposition groups depended largely—though not entirely—on the degree of ideological affinity. Schmidt has claimed that 'we supported *all* democratic parties and labour unions to the best of our ability', but there is in fact no evidence of German government intervention on behalf of the PCE or the Communist-controlled Workers' Commissions. Nevertheless, the German SPD–FPD coalition governments of 1969–82 proved considerably more interventionist than

Pompidou's government of 1970–4, or Heath's Conservative government of the same period.

The German government's efforts proved particularly effective in this respect. In 1971 the German Embassy secured the release of a group of prominent socialist leaders, amongst them González, accused of membership of an illegal organization. In 1975, at the Helsinki summit, Schmidt successfully requested Arias Navarro to restore González's passport. Months later, with the help of Prince Juan Carlos, a different German ambassador obtained the release of another prominent socialist, responsible for his party's external relations, who had been arrested for criticizing the government during a visit to Sweden.²³

Diplomatic pressure from West European governments did not always succeed, however. In early 1974, for example, a young anarchist was garrotted by the authorities in spite of pleas for clemency from abroad. In September 1975 five activists belonging to the terrorist organizations ETA and FRAP were also executed by the regime in defiance of international public opinion, in response to which every major European government recalled its ambassador from Madrid. It is no doubt significant that in both cases the victims lacked substantial support from abroad, not least because European public opinion was divided over the question of the use of violence against a non-democratic regime.²⁴

In November 1975, the major European governments reaffirmed their condemnation of the regime by abstaining from sending high-level representatives to Franco's funeral. This was in marked contrast to the presence of President Giscard d'Estaing, President Scheel, and the Duke of Edinburgh at Juan Carlos's proclamation ceremony held shortly afterwards. The French president, who had been recruited to the young monarch's cause by the latter's father, Don Juan, became a staunch advocate of Spanish democratization. Even Prime Minister Harold Wilson, hardly a friend of the Franco regime, became quietly supportive when he learnt of the king's intentions from Lord Mountbatten.²⁵

In the wake of Franco's death, leading European governments pursued two separate though complementary strategies with regard to Spain. On the one hand, they did their best to urge the king and his successive governments to move slowly but surely along the road to full democratization. At the same time, they supported the moderate opposition—and, in the Italian case, the Communists as well—in their efforts to conquer official recognition and win the right to participate in free elections to a constituent assembly.

The German government, which had intervened so decisively in

events in Portugal, was particularly anxious to ensure that the PCE did not establish itself as the hegemonic party of the Left, and strongly supported the PSOE in its transition from clandestinity to legality. Thus, in late 1975 the German ambassador complained to foreign minister Areilza that Chancellor Schmidt came under pressure from his party, the SPD, every time the Spanish police acted against the PSOE. On other occasions, it was the PSOE's initiatives—such as the decision to join the PCE in a broad opposition alliance in March 1976—which prompted Areilza to seek German government support in requesting the SPD to apply pressure on their Spanish allies.²⁶

The ability of West European governments to deal with both government and opposition in this manner is best understood against the background of Spain's relations with the European Community, and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe. Both these institutions had consistently refused to accept Spain as a full member on account of the non-democratic nature of its regime, effectively imposing a long-standing veto which served both to undermine its credibility and to encourage those committed to democratic change.²⁷

Spain's application for associate membership of the EEC in 1962 had prompted an immediate response from European socialists in the form of the European Parliament's Birkelbach report, which stated that 'only states which guarantee in their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms' should be eligible. The leaders of both the internal and the exiled anti-Franco opposition subsequently met at Munich under the auspices of the European Movement, formally requesting that Spain be excluded from the major European institutions until democracy was restored. Despite the changes which subsequently took place within the opposition camp, this aspect of their programme was to remain unaltered during the ensuing fifteen years.

The European Parliament's recommendation did not prevent the EC Commission from exploring closer links with Spain, a process which eventually led to the signing of a preferential trade agreement in 1970. Although this was extremely favourable to Spanish economic interests, Britain's accession in 1973 threatened to disrupt it, forcing Madrid to seek fresh talks with Brussels, a process still under way at the time of Franco's death.²⁸

In the Spanish case, the EC represented a complex system of medium- and long-term incentives and guarantees tending to favour democratization. On the one hand, by depriving Spain of the real (and imagined) benefits of full integration in a rapidly developing community, the EC's veto contributed to undermining the ruling

authoritarian coalition, elements of which began to regard the regime's continued existence as a hindrance to their present and future prosperity. Economic élites became particularly anxious after the 1973 enlargement, due to the importance of the British market for Spanish goods. The literature produced by the regime's reformists in the 1969–75 period, particularly in the wake of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco's assassination in 1973, provides ample evidence of this growing dissatisfaction.²⁹

Additionally, the veto enforced by the EC (and to a lesser extent, that of the Council of Europe), together with the growing prosperity and stability of Western Europe in the 1960s, contributed to enhancing the appeal of parliamentary democracy as practised in EC member states in the eyes of Spanish élites and public opinion at large. More specifically, regardless of its shortcomings, the EC came to be seen as the embodiment of European values, notably liberal democracy, and an antidote to the regime's authoritarianism. It was thus widely accepted that the democratizing process would be incomplete until it had been formally sanctioned by Brussels, while Spain's continued exclusion from the EC would represent an insult to national pride as well as a negation of democratic credibility.³⁰

Finally, both before and during the transition to democracy, the prospect of EC membership provided guarantees and reassurances to those who faced a post-authoritarian future with apprehension. As Whitehead has observed, membership could be expected to guarantee the free movement of capital, the freedom to travel and seek employment abroad, and legal protection against arbitrary confiscation of property, all of which were highly valued by Spain's wealthy classes. The same author has argued that if such external guarantees had existed for these classes in the 1930s, they would have been far less inclined to take up arms against the Second Republic.³¹

The mere fact that by the early 1970s even the Communists were enthusiastic advocates of EC membership for a democratic Spain represented a significant guarantee. The Communists were evidently aware of this, and never missed an opportunity to publicize their commitment to European democratic values. Thus when they finally succeeded in forming their own opposition platform, the Junta Democrática, in 1974, they hastened to present their political programme to the EC authorities in Brussels. The socialist-inspired Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática, formed in 1975, proved equally anxious to have its European—and hence democratic—credentials endorsed by the EC.

In his enthronement speech of November 1975, King Juan Carlos

proclaimed Spain's renewed commitment to full integration in Europe's major institutions, a goal subsequently reaffirmed by his first government. By so doing, those in power effectively invited the EC (and the Council of Europe) to monitor developments in Spain and pass judgement as to when and how the political requisites for membership should be met. This simultaneously enabled the democratic opposition to open an external, European front in their ongoing struggle with those in power.

Both the European Parliament (EP) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had already begun to perform this task in the wake of Carrero Blanco's assassination in late 1973, largely, though by no means exclusively, at the instigation of their socialist members. The March 1974 execution of the young anarchist, combined with government threats of expulsion against the Bishop of Bilbao for his defence of Basque minority rights, prompted the EP to warn Madrid that this behaviour was unacceptable from a candidate for EC membership. In October 1975, after appealing to the Spanish authorities for clemency, the EP responded to the execution of the five anti-Franco activists with a resolution demanding the suspension of the talks then taking place between the EC and Spain for the updating of the 1970 agreement, which the Commission and the Council promptly endorsed. As we saw above, with the exception of Ireland, the governments of all EC members states recalled their ambassadors from Madrid. Much to the irritation of many MEPs, however, the Council agreed to resume talks in early 1976, before the new Spanish government had proved its democratizing intentions.

The EP held a major debate on Spain in February 1976, in the course of which Socialist and Communist MEPs dismissed Arias Navarro's programme as a half-hearted liberalization of the existing political system. Earlier, a debate in the Council of Europe's Assembly had produced similar conclusions, and a resolution reminding the Spanish authorities that admission to the major European institutions required the legalization of all political parties and the election of a parliament by universal suffrage. Significantly, the resolution also called on all political parties represented in the Assembly to assist their Spanish counterparts by every means available.

Areilza's subsequent tour of the nine EC capitals failed to convince Brussels of his government's willingness or ability to carry out far-reaching reforms. Relations reached their lowest point in April 1976, following the arrest of opposition leaders who had met to announce the creation of a single opposition platform, thereby foiling government efforts to exclude Communists from the demo-

cratizing process. This prompted a formal protest from EC heads of government which greatly embarrassed both the king and his foreign minister.³²

In May 1976 the EP adopted a text by its rapporteur on Spain, Maurice Faure, which explicitly linked Spanish membership of the EC to progress on the road to democracy. Faure specifically condemned Arias Navarro's plans for a bicameral Cortes, in which a democratically elected Congress would share power with a 'corporatist' Senate, on the grounds that such a Parliament 'would not measure up to the democratic standards we in the countries of Western Europe set for ourselves'. Significantly, he also objected to government attempts to exclude the PCE from the first elections, arguing that 'the legal existence of communist parties is a characteristic common to our Western democracies' and consequently a requisite for Spanish accession to the EC. As we have seen, this was in marked contrast to the US State Department's stance on the issue.

The king's decision to replace Arias Navarro with Suárez in July 1976 paved the way for a rapid improvement in Spain's political relations with the European institutions. After discussing Suárez's programme with government and opposition representatives in Madrid, the EP and Assembly rapporteurs agreed to give him the benefit of the doubt. In December, Faure returned to express EP satisfaction at the success of the referendum on the decisive Political Reform Law, and advised the government to bring the PSOE into the political process as soon as possible so as to avoid a return to the popular frontism of the 1930s. Interestingly, he also recommended that Spain adopt a system of proportional representation like the German system, on the grounds that majoritarian systems were better suited to well-established democracies. In the event, the government adopted an electoral system not unlike that proposed by Faure.³³

In April 1977 the EP responded to the legalization of the Communist Party with a resolution which amounted to an enthusiastic endorsement of Suárez's performance to date. Three months later, in the wake of Spain's first democratic elections in over thirty years, the EP expressed the 'political will to see Spain occupy its place in the European Community as soon as possible', in view of which the newly elected government immediately submitted its application. The Assembly also hastened to recognize the new democratic Cortes, and invited its representatives to attend its meetings as observers, which paved the way for full membership of the Council of Europe in November 1977. That autumn, Suárez

embarked on a tour of the nine EC capitals, in the course of which it became apparent that, in spite of having met the political requisites laid down by Brussels, Spain's road to full membership would be a difficult one. Nevertheless, this external, largely symbolic endorsement of Spanish democratization was extremely important in the eyes of domestic actors.

The ability to monitor and influence developments in Spain from abroad in this manner—even during Franco's lifetime—may largely be attributed to the existence of effective transnational party networks.³⁴ Thus, the presidents of the EP's Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal groups were in constant communication with their Spanish allies, who kept them fully informed of the latest developments. At the same time, these links enabled the Spanish opposition to have a direct say in the formulation of motions and questions debated by the EP and the Assembly.

As well as enabling the European institutions to influence events in Spain, these transnational links proved highly beneficial to the democratic opposition. After forty years of authoritarian rule, only highly committed anti-Francoists were fully satisfied as to the opposition's right to speak on behalf of Spanish democrats. Access to European institutions which were widely associated with democratic values thus played a crucial role in the domestic opposition's efforts to establish their credibility in the eyes of potential voters.

The Socialist International

The most effective transnational party organization active in Spain was undoubtedly the Socialist International (SI). Partly due to the prominent place occupied by the Civil War in the collective memory of the European Left, the SI had been consistently hostile to the Franco regime since its relaunching in 1951, and one of its first acts was to protest against the United States' *rapprochement* with the Franco regime, on the grounds that 'democracy cannot be defended by measures which would reinforce the position of dictatorship in the world'. It was thus by no means coincidental that Birkelbach, the author of the report which largely stymied Spain's 1962 EC application, should have been the president of the EP's socialist group.

Although the PSOE had been a founding member of the SI, in the 1960s its lack of social support within Spain and the shortcomings of its exiled leadership led some European parties to cultivate the increasingly attractive and independent PCE as well as other

socialist groups. Professor Tierno Galván's Partido Socialista del Interior, formed in 1968, was particularly successful in attracting support from the German SPD. Indeed, for much of this period, the PSOE relied very heavily on the financial assistance of its sister union, the UGT, which was in turn largely provided by West European and North American labour organizations. In 1972, however, the younger, more dynamic sectors of the party, both in Spain and abroad, successfully challenged the exiled faction led by Llopi, whose desperate attempt to remain in control by calling his own congress merely formalized the split within the party. After failing to arbitrate a friendly reconciliation, the SI temporarily suspended the PSOE's membership until it could determine which faction was entitled to speak on behalf of Spanish socialists, finally settling for the larger group, active within Spain, in early 1974.

In many ways, the defeated historic faction led by Llopi was more in tune with the major parties of the SI—particularly those of northern Europe—than the renovated PSOE. Llopi was moderate, pro-Western, and deeply anti-Communist, while his rivals cultivated a radical left-wing rhetoric, were highly critical of the US presence in Spain, and understood the need to collaborate with the PCE, which was after all by far the largest opposition party. In spite of this, the SI opted for the latter because it believed it to have a much more active presence in Spain. The renovated PSOE lobbied hard in several countries to win external support, but it was the visits to Spain by Italian socialists and by Michael Foot during 1973 which proved decisive.³⁵

Paradoxically, once they awoke to its potential, it was the more moderate, northern European members of the SI—notably the German, Swedish, and Austrian parties—which proved most supportive of the renovated PSOE. Mitterrand was initially very sceptical as to the PSOE's possibilities, and showed far greater interest in the PCE. This was of course fully in keeping with his own electoral strategy, which envisaged an alliance with the PCF capable of taking him to the presidency. Largely due to his rivalry with the Stalinist PCP, at first Soares also courted Carrillo, who was the guest of honour at his party conference in late 1974, much to the PSOE's chagrin. Although relations with the PSF improved considerably after Franco's death, the PSOE systematically opposed Mitterrand's efforts to forge a Mediterranean socialist identity, which were clearly aimed at reducing the SPD's influence in the SI.³⁶

The SI's immediate goal in Spain was the establishment of a Western-style parliamentary democracy. Member parties applied

pressure on the Spanish authorities both directly, through the national governments in which they held or shared power, and indirectly, through their representatives in the major European institutions. At the same time, SI parties offered the PSOE substantial financial, political, and diplomatic support, thereby contributing to the process whereby the small, ill-organized faction which emerged in 1972–4 was able to develop into the major opposition party by 1977.³⁷

The SI owed much of its clout to its ability to influence Spain's relations with both the EC and NATO, notably the former. On the eve of Franco's death, parties belonging to the SI held office—alone or in coalition—in six of the nine EC members states. In mid-1975 the SI formally reminded member parties that 'as long as there is not a democratic government in place, Spain should not be associated with NATO or with the European Community', urging them to 'ensure that the present status of Spain *vis-à-vis* NATO and the EEC is not modified'. In October the SI played a major role in the international campaign unleashed against the regime in protest at the executions mentioned above, with Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme taking the lead. Only days before Franco's death, the SI urged parties currently in office in Western Europe to apply pressure on the United States and France 'not to establish any new military or political relations with the new regime and to avoid giving Juan Carlos new prestige', while encouraging the latter to 'establish a full democracy in Spain and to end the structure and institutions of the Franco regime'.³⁸

Not surprisingly, in his tour of EC capitals in early 1976, Areilza soon discovered that ministers were anxious to discuss—and if possible influence—his government's attitude towards the PSOE and other socialist parties. In Britain, Denmark, and Germany (where he visited the headquarters of the SPD), it was made clear to him that the prompt legalization of the PSOE would significantly improve Spain's standing with EC members. In Luxembourg Areilza was even advised to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, given the Israeli Labour party's ability to influence SI attitudes to Spanish membership of the EC.³⁹

As well as encouraging democratization, the SI hoped to contribute to the emergence of a well-organized, broad-based democratic socialist party capable of attaining power in the not too distant future. In 1974 the SI duly created a special Spain Committee, consisting of representatives from the major member parties, which was given the task of channelling financial and political support to the PSOE. Indeed, when the PSOE established its headquarters

in Madrid in 1975, it largely relied on funds raised abroad to do so. Member parties also played a prominent role in promoting González, who only stepped into the limelight after his election as first secretary in October 1974. It was then that he met Willy Brandt, the SI's most influential figure, who formally launched him on to the European stage at the SPD party conference held at Mannheim in late 1975.⁴⁰ In January 1976 the SI sent a high-level delegation to Spain, providing the PSOE with its first opportunity to publicize its status as the only internationally recognized Spanish socialist party. SI support for the party reached its climax at the PSOE's XXVIIth Congress, held in Madrid in December 1976, which was addressed by Brandt, Palme (both in Spanish), Mitterrand, Nenni, and Foot, amongst others. In June 1977 prominent SI leaders returned to Spain to play a leading role in the PSOE's first highly successful election campaign.

This highly visible external support for the PSOE proved crucial in a number of ways. First, by recognizing and publicly endorsing the renovated PSOE, the SI largely decided the outcome of the ongoing struggle between rival socialist groupings, which had hitherto competed for international support. The PSOE's external recognition even led Tierno Galvan's group—which had failed to obtain observer status from the SI in March 1974—to change its name from Partido Socialista del Interior to Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). Deprived of the support of the major European parties, the PSP was forced to seek material assistance from Third World socialist parties such as those of Libya and Iraq, which partly accounts for its increasingly radical, anti-imperialist image. This no doubt undermined its appeal in the eyes of a predominantly moderate would-be electorate.⁴¹

More importantly, perhaps, the SI's endorsement enabled the PSOE to adopt an increasingly independent stance *vis-à-vis* its major rival on the Left, namely the PCE. Without such explicit external support the PSOE leadership would have been less successful in resisting Communist efforts to include them in their Junta Democrática in 1974, thereby jeopardizing their ability to pursue their own, significantly more pragmatic, strategy. (Similarly, it was partly the support of European and North American labour organizations which enabled the socialist trade union UGT to resist the hegemonic ambitions of the Communist-controlled Workers' Commissions.) When the PSOE finally agreed to join the PCE in a new Coordinación Democrática in March 1976, it was able to do so on its own terms. In the event, it was the PSOE rather than the PCE which benefited most from the *reforma pactada* process, with

the latter obtaining a mere 9 per cent of the vote in the first elections. Finally, association with the leading figures of the European socialist movement—many of whom were in office in their respective countries—enabled the PSOE to project a democratic, responsible image at home, at a time when the would-be electorate remained apprehensive about the outcome of the transition.

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which SI support—and in particular that of its most influential member, the SPD—influenced the PSOE's strategy during democratization. According to Suárez, when Brandt visited Madrid in December 1976 to attend the PSOE conference, he advised its leaders to take part in the first elections regardless of whether the PCE was also allowed to do so. In spite of public statements to the contrary, however, it would appear that González had already reached this conclusion of his own accord.⁴² The SI's external pressure complemented the PSOE's strategy most effectively, but this was essentially an indigenous product.

It is equally problematic to ascertain the SI's ideological impact. As we have seen, the young men who took over the PSOE in 1972–4 were initially characterized by their radical political discourse, which is probably best understood in terms of the party's rivalry with the far better established PCE. The 1976 conference, so well attended by SI leaders, ironically produced the most radical programme ever adopted by the PSOE, though not much of it found its way into the 1977 election manifesto. Frequent contact with more moderate—particularly north European—socialist leaders may have influenced González's outlook, and critics both within the party and outside it have often attributed his alleged rightward shift to external pressures. This evolution, however, is probably best explained in terms of domestic demands and possibilities.⁴³

Other Transnational Influences

The PSOE was not the only party to benefit from the existence of transnational party links. In 1972 the major Christian Democratic parties active in Spain had joined forces as the Equipo Demócrata Cristiano del Estado Español (EDCEE), precisely so as to take fuller advantage of the support available from the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD).⁴⁴ The latter was generally less active than the SI during this period, and less able to apply pressure on major European governments, but its members played a major role in EP and Council of Europe initiatives relating to Spain.

The EUCD's support was essentially political. Its representatives

attended the EDCEE's second and third conferences in 1975 and 1976, and came out in force for the 'Encounter with Europe' staged by the Spaniards in January 1977. The absence of Germany's CDU at this gathering did not augur well for the EDCEE, however. The Germans were fully aware of the latter's leadership problems and overall lack of social support, which they largely attributed to a left-wing programme which was out of tune with their potential electorate. The CDU therefore opted for the more moderate sectors of the Christian Democratic family, which had gradually accepted the need to join forces with the reformists then in power. This did not prevent the rest of the EUCD parties from actively supporting the Federación Demócrata Cristiana, which finally fought the 1977 elections, in which they failed to win a single seat. Indeed it could be argued that in this case the external support enjoyed by the EDCEE proved counter-productive, in that it encouraged them to stand alone rather than ally with the reformists. With the exception of several regional parties, the only Christian Democrats to win seats in the new Congress were those who joined Suárez's loose electoral alliance, Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), who received limited material support from the CDU and the Venezuelan COPEI.⁴⁶

The Suárez government also sought to benefit from the transnational Christian Democratic network. Given his initial lack of democratic credentials, when he formed his first cabinet in July 1976, Suárez was careful to include a large contingent of Christian Democratic reformists in the hope that this would make his government more acceptable to European democratic opinion. Similarly, in January 1977, he made much of his meetings with leading EUCD leaders, notably the Belgian prime minister Leo Tindemann. Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Osorio also took advantage of their presence in Madrid to seek their support for a future broad-based, government-led Christian Democratic party, though without success.⁴⁶

Inevitably, the effectiveness of transnational party networks depended not only on their own willingness and ability to intervene in Spain, but most importantly on the social support and organizational skills available to domestic counterparts. This was particularly evident in the case of the Liberal International (LI), the least active of three major transnational organizations, whose ability to influence events in Spain was severely limited by the absence of substantial domestic interlocutors.⁴⁷

In spite of this, the transnational liberal network operated in a very similar manner to its Socialist and Christian Democratic counterparts, in relation to both national governments and European

institutions. Aware of the precedent established by the other two political families, in March 1977 the Spanish Liberal parties hosted a major gathering, which was attended by the LI's leading figures. In the Liberal case, the German FDP proved more successful than the CDU, and convinced its Spanish friends to join Suárez's nascent coalition. Suárez—who once again publicized his meeting with Europe's only liberal prime minister, Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg—has admitted that he invited these tiny liberal parties into his coalition largely on account of their standing with the LI.⁴⁸

In spite of the absence of an institutionalized transnational organization which could come to its assistance, external support also played a significant role in the case of the PCE. Given that the existing transnational Communist network was dominated by the CPSU and its allies, Carrillo was forced to look elsewhere for external support.⁴⁹ The PCE initially sought a *rapprochement* with the SI, but the SPD's hostility to Communism and the PSOE's reluctance to collaborate with the PCE frustrated its efforts. Carrillo therefore turned to the more independent and unorthodox Communist parties, partly with a view to enhancing the PCE's democratic credibility in the eyes of potential Spanish voters.⁵⁰ The PCI was a particularly attractive partner, because of both its Eurocommunist strategy and its electoral success. Italian Communists proved particularly effective in the EP when it came to defending the PCE's legalization, and it is significant that the latter should have chosen Rome as the venue for the public presentation of its Central Committee in July 1976. Berlinguer and Marchais undoubtedly contributed to the PCE's legalization by attending Carrillo's Eurocommunist summit in Madrid in March 1977, which the Suárez government was forced to allow in order to avoid an international scandal.

The prominence of German political parties within the transnational networks discussed above is partly attributable to the role played by their political foundations, which established themselves in Spain in 1976–7.⁵¹ The most active of these was undoubtedly the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, linked to the SPD, which opened an office in Madrid in 1976, at a time when the PSOE had not yet been legally recognized.⁵² The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, associated with the CDU, was generally less active in Europe at this stage, but nevertheless provided the EDCEE parties with a degree of support.⁵³ In view of their lack of success in the 1977 elections, it subsequently backed the Christian Democratic parties which joined the UCD. Similarly, the FDP's Friedrich Naumann Foundation associated itself with the liberal groups which entered Suárez's

coalition. Finally, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, linked to the CSU, whose leader, Strauss, had cultivated several of Franco's ministers in the 1960s, lent its support to Fraga's Alianza Popular after 1976.

The above discussion would appear to validate Whitehead's view that the democratic opposition is an apparently domestic category which may in practice be closely linked to international politics, and that 'when opposition parties undertake realignments or negotiate pacts, there is usually a substantial international infrastructure of support'. Another domestic institution whose role in the Spanish democratizing process was greatly conditioned by its external links, in this case with the Vatican, was the Catholic Church.

The Spanish Catholic Church was initially one of the mainstays of the Franco regime, a relationship formally acknowledged by the Concordat of 1953. In the 1960s, however, social changes taking place within Spain and the new attitudes aired at the Second Vatican Council led the Spanish Church to adopt an increasingly independent, even critical stance. This was greatly resented by the regime (notably by Franco himself), which clung to its anachronistic privileges in a desperate attempt to retain control over Spanish Catholics. In 1973, however, the Episcopal Conference, the collective voice of the Spanish hierarchy, publicly advocated disengagement from the regime and the formal separation of Church and state. Relations reached their lowest point in early 1974, when the government ordered the Bishop of Bilbao out of the country, only to discover that he could not be removed without the Pope's permission, which was not forthcoming. This scandal had a major impact on Catholic reformists within the regime, for it revealed the extent to which the latter had become incompatible with their long-term goal of upholding the Church's influence in Spanish society.⁵⁴

By the early 1970s, the Vatican had very specific reasons for wanting a change of regime. In 1941 Franco had reluctantly been granted the right of presentation to bishoprics, which granted him a considerable degree of influence over the appointment of bishops. This was incompatible with the Second Vatican Council's insistence on the Church's autonomy relative to all political systems, and in 1968 Pope Paul VI asked Franco to renounce the right of presentation, thereby earning the lasting hatred of regime hardliners. The Head of State refused, however, and was unmoved when the Spanish bishops themselves reiterated the Vatican's request in 1973. Over time, it became clear to bishops and Pope alike that only a change of regime could result in a separation of Church and state such as that desired by Rome and the majority of the Spanish population.

The Church's attitude towards democratization was defined by Cardinal Tarancón, archbishop of Madrid and president of the Episcopal Conference since 1971, in a homily read in Juan Carlos's presence to mark his enthronement. In it, Tarancón advocated disengagement not only from the confessional state, but from authoritarianism as well. Arias Navarro initially resisted the Vatican's efforts to renegotiate the Concordat, but his dismissal allowed Juan Carlos to impose his own views on the matter. In July 1976 he formally renounced the right of presentation he had inherited from Franco, paving the way for the negotiation of a series of agreements which effectively replaced the Concordat. When Foreign Minister Oreja subsequently met Pope Paul VI, the latter urged him to inform the king that he had nothing to fear from the Church, which supported him in his efforts to bring about democratic change. Earlier, Areilza had found him equally supportive.⁵⁶

It could also be argued that the Vatican's policies—as interpreted by the Spanish Church—had a significant impact on the future party system. The absence of a large, broad-based Christian Democratic party in Spain after 1975 has generally been attributed to the process of rapid secularization experienced by Spanish society in the preceding decades, as well as to the lack of a well-established pre-Francoist democratic Catholic tradition. Equally importantly, however, the emergence of a Christian Democratic party in the 1970s would not have been in keeping with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, and under Tarancón the Spanish Church never lent its support to the many political groups which sought its blessing. Indeed, some of those who struggled in vain to bring about the creation of such a party in time for the 1977 elections have partly attributed their failure to the opposition of the Vatican and the Spanish hierarchy. Be this as it may, it could of course be argued that the UCD ultimately performed a role not unlike that of the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe in their own post-war democratic restorations.⁵⁶

One of the defining characteristics of the Spanish transition process was undoubtedly the leading role played by the restored monarchy as a bridging institution. As we have seen, Juan Carlos's appointment as Franco's successor in 1969 enabled him to establish links abroad which allowed Western democracies to express support for the future king without antagonizing the existing regime. Thereafter, it was largely through Juan Carlos that Western governments channelled their support for a gradual, non-violent transition to democracy. From the king's point of view, access to Western leaders who had traditionally spurned Franco was also beneficial

in that it enabled him to acquire badly needed democratic credentials at home.

The king occasionally turned to external actors when he wished to communicate with domestic actors who were beyond easy reach. In the spring of 1976 Juan Carlos wished to reassure Carrillo personally of his determination to legalize the PCE, while simultaneously convincing him of the impossibility of doing so in the near future. Unable to relay this message directly, he turned to the Romanian autocrat Ceaucescu, whom he had met in Iran in 1971, and who was known to be close to Carrillo. The latter duly travelled to Bucharest to receive the king's message, which, while failing to appease him, nevertheless provided him with first-hand evidence of Juan Carlos's democratizing intentions.⁵⁷

Ceaucescu was not the only foreign dictator to whom the king appealed for help in advancing the democratizing process while simultaneously consolidating the monarchy. In June 1977, shortly after the first democratic elections, Juan Carlos wrote to the Shah of Iran, whom he had actively cultivated as a prince, requesting \$10 million 'on behalf of the political party of Prime Minister Suárez', as the autocrat's 'personal contribution to the strengthening of the Spanish monarchy'. In order to justify this appeal, Juan Carlos claimed that the PSOE's excellent performance in the recent elections constituted 'a serious threat to the country's security and to the stability of the monarchy', in view of which it was essential to secure Suárez's victory at the forthcoming municipal elections (which were subsequently postponed until 1979).⁵⁸ Given the king's behaviour throughout the transition process, and the Shah's own ideological preferences, it is reasonable to assume that the letter was worded thus so as to increase the likelihood of a favourable response. Unfortunately, it is not known how the Shah reacted to this request, though it would appear that Juan Carlos had been successful in obtaining financial assistance from him in the past.⁵⁹

Conclusion

Whitehead has observed that the methods used against Franco's Spain in 1946–8 (such as exclusion from the United Nations and from Marshall Aid, closure of the frontier, and recognition of a government-in-exile) probably represent the most drastic attempt to induce redemocratization anywhere in the post-war period, short of outright invasion. In spite of these efforts, the Franco regime

survived for almost another thirty years. Given this precedent, it is perhaps not surprising that those hoping to advance the cause of democracy in Spain from abroad should have opted for a more subtle approach, based on longer-term inducements and disincentives. This chapter has argued that it was essentially the West European actors—national governments, multinational institutions, transnational party organizations, and political foundations—which proved most effective in applying pressure or channelling support. Given the extent of their involvement, it is perhaps not the least of their achievements that Spaniards only rarely perceived such activities as improper, to such an extent that once their own democracy had been consolidated, Spanish actors would seek to emulate these practices elsewhere.

Notes

1. The major exception is J. Story and B. Pollack, 'Spain's Transition: Domestic and External Linkages', in G. Pridham (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context and Regime Transition in Southern Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
2. L. Whitehead, 'International Aspects of Democratization', in G. O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
3. G. Gortázar, 'El último franquismo: actitudes y preocupaciones de los españoles según los sondeos del Instituto de Opinión Pública', in H. de la Torre (ed.), *Portugal y España en el cambio político* (Mérida, 1989), 130–2.
4. A. Tovias, 'The International Context of Democratic Transition', in G. Pridham (ed.), *The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 169.
5. The impact of the Portuguese Revolution on Spanish public opinion at large should not be exaggerated. According to a major poll, in October 1974 only 48 per cent of the urban Spanish population knew the revolution had taken place, and only 20 per cent expressed any sympathy: Instituto de Opinión Pública, Study number 1,075, 1974.
6. Felipe González, statement to the Seminar on Spain's Transition to Democracy, organized by the José Ortega y Gasset Foundation (Toledo, 1984).
7. See for example the views of the Tácito group, many of whose members were in office in 1975–8, in *Tácito* (Madrid, 1975), 237–40, 385–7.
8. In 1977 Juan Carlos explained to the Shah of Iran that on acceding to the throne he had 'vowed to tread in the path of democracy, endeavour-

ing always to be one step ahead of events in order to forestall a situation like that in Portugal which might prove even more dire in this country of mine': A. Alam, *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969–1977* (London, 1991), 553.

9. According to Willy Brandt, 'in the spring, late summer and early autumn it looked as though [the Communists] would take over the country completely. I urged the mobilization of a counter-force, not only out of solidarity with our Portuguese political allies but for the sake of European development as a whole. There followed a relief operation whose full story cannot yet be written. It was the product of secret collaboration between a handful of social democratic party leaders': W. Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960–75* (London: Collins, 1976), 489–90.
10. H. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (New York: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, US Dept. of State, 1982), 870; W. Stabler, 'The View from the US Embassy', in H. Binnendijk (ed.), *Authoritarian Regimes in Transition* (Washington: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, US Dept. of State, 1987), 192. See also A. Tovias, 'US Policy toward Democratic Transition in Southern Europe', in Pridham (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy*.
11. S. D. Eaton, *The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974–79: A Personal Account* (Stanford, Calif.: Hooker Institution Press, 1983), 116–17.
12. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 870. V. A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 551.
13. For the opposition's view of the Rogers visit, see J. M. de Areilza, *Crónica de Libertad* (Barcelona: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 150–5, and E. Tierno Galván, *Cabos Sueltos* (Barcelona: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 414–19. Stabler, 'View from Embassy', 192–6. S. G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 611.
14. H. Schmidt, *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (London, 1990), 167. For a similar exchange between Kissinger and the Irish prime minister, see G. Fitzgerald, *All in a Life* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 180. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger admitted that Madrid had threatened to block the renewal of the agreement if Washington issued pleas for clemency: *Time*, 13 October 1975.
15. On the 1976 Treaty talks, see J. M. de Areilza, *Diario de un ministro de la Monarquía* (Barcelona, 1977), 14–15, 45.
16. Areilza, *Diario*, 61, 65–7, 195–6. Eaton, *Forces of Freedom*, 127–8.
17. A. Osorio, *Trayectoria política de un ministro de la Corona* (Barcelona, 1980), 280. Stabler, 'View from Embassy', 197.
18. According to the PCE's Secretary General, Brezhnev himself urged Juan Carlos—via the Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez—not to legalize the party until after the first democratic elections: S. Carrillo, *Memorias* (Barcelona, 1993), 633.
19. See R. Legvold, 'The Soviet Union and West European Communism',

- and E. M. Mujal-León, 'The Domestic and International Evolution of the Spanish Communist Party', in R. L. Tokés (ed.), *Eurocommunism and Détente* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).
20. See Whitehead, *International Aspects of Democratization*, 10–16.
 21. In Schmidt's view, in both Portugal and Spain, 'Bonn gambled on positive changes and tried to contribute to that end, while Washington remained sceptical.' Schmidt, *Men and Powers*, 168. 'In view of Germany's own experiences', Brandt wrote with reference to Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 'I did not think it right to sit in moral judgement, but we could not remain indifferent to the fate of these nations. We had to show solidarity wherever possible. I was never in any doubt that dictatorships hamper Western co-operation and do not belong in the European Community': Brandt, *People*, 164.
 22. See Areilza, *Crónica*, 103–6, 109, and Tierno Galván, *Cabos Sueltos*, 421–2.
 23. W. Brandt, *My Life in Politics* (London, 1992), 315; A. Papell, *Conversaciones con Luis Yáñez* (Madrid, 1992), 104.
 24. When Garret Fitzgerald discussed this episode with Kissinger, the latter 'mumbled something about European countries taking a free ride and making mock-heroic decisions so long as they don't have to pay for them'. The secretary thought European governments had been 'hypocritical in the extreme', and could not understand why 'the execution of convicted cop killers [should] be turned into a moral issue': Fitzgerald, *All in a Life*, 180.
 25. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *Le Pouvoir et la vie* (Paris: Compagnie 12, 1988), 283. In December 1975 Wilson told President Ford that 'I recognise, even if it cannot be put bluntly in public, that King Juan Carlos has a very hard row to hoe. So we shall encourage him privately to move as fast as possible, but try to avoid public condemnation when we can, if the pace is slower than public opinion expectation here may demand': P. Ziegler, *The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), 464.
 26. Areilza, *Diario*, 15, 122.
 27. See G. Pridham, 'The Politics of the European Community: Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe', in Pridham (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy*.
 28. The proportion of Spain's imports from the EC rose from 25 to 49 per cent during 1960–70, and trading figures increased substantially after the 1970 agreement and the EC's enlargement in 1973.
 29. See for example the articles of the Tácito group, whose members later made a major contribution to the Suárez reform, in *Tácito* (Madrid, 1975).
 30. On the nature of Spanish Europeanism in this period, see F. Morán, *Una política exterior para España* (Barcelona, 1980), 289–98.
 31. Whitehead, *International Aspects of Democratization*, 23.
 32. Areilza, *Diario*, 125.
 33. Osorio, *Trayectoria política*, 157–8. Areilza's successor, Marcelino

- Oreja, received identical advice from foreign minister Genscher in August 1976: author's interview with Oreja, 1994.
34. See P. Letamendia (ed.), *L'Intervention des organisations partisans transnationales dans le processus de democratization espagnol* (Université de Bordeaux, I, 1982).
 35. R. Gillespie, *The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 285–7.
 36. Mitterrand hosted two conferences of southern European socialist parties—in January 1976 and May 1977—which ostensibly studied specifically southern problems, such as the presence of large Communist parties, the viability of EC enlargement, etc.
 37. Membership of the renovated PSOE grew from 3,400 in August 1972, to some 10,000 in December 1976, and to an estimated 200,000 by late 1977.
 38. Minutes of the third meeting of the Spain Committee, 10 July 1975, Circular No. S 6/75. Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Spain Committee, 16 November 1975: Socialist International archive, Amsterdam.
 39. Areilza, *Diario*, 47, 100.
 40. In July 1975 the Spain Committee had advised the SI to invite PSOE delegations led by González to conduct highly publicized tours of member countries, the 'principal goal being to make the First Secretary of the PSOE better known, especially in Northern Europe'. Brandt would later write that 'I am still proud to think that under my leadership, the SPD sent more than fine words to help Spanish democracy to its feet': Brandt, *My Life*, 315. The PSOE also received aid from the French, Italian, British, Swedish, Austrian, Dutch, and Venezuelan parties.
 41. The PSP's first party conference, held in June 1976, was attended by delegates from parties in Libya, Yugoslavia, and Mexico, amongst others. In the 1977 elections, the PSP obtained 4.4 per cent of the vote (and only 1.7 per cent of the seats in the Congress), as compared to the PSOE's 29 per cent (and 33 per cent of the seats). After lengthy negotiations, a debt-ridden PSP finally agreed to its absorption by the PSOE in 1979.
 42. Author's interview with Suárez, 1985. González's statement to the Seminar on Spain's Transition to Democracy.
 43. For a PSOE view of SPD influence on the SI see Menéndez del Valle, *El Socialista*, 23 October 1977. Already in April 1976, a prominent SI figure, Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, told the Spanish ambassador in Vienna that he found González surprisingly conservative for his age: L. López Rodó, *Claves de la transición* (Madrid, 1993), 233.
 44. The EDCEE consisted of Ruiz Giménez's Izquierda Democrática, Gil Robles's Federación Popular Democrática, the Basque Nationalist Party, and the Catalan Unió Democrática. The first two parties subsequently formed Federación Demócrata Cristiana.
 45. F. Alvarez de Miranda, *Del 'contubernio' al consenso* (Barcelona, 1985), 84–5, 122.

46. Author's interview with Suárez, 1985; Osorio, *Trayectoria política*, 297.
47. The Spanish members of the LI were Garrigues Walker's Federación de Partidos Demócratas y Liberales, Camuñas's Partido Demócrata Popular, and the Esquerra Democrática de Catalunya of Trias Fargas.
48. Author's interview with Suárez, 1985.
49. In 1975 the Mexican PRI gave the PCE-led Junta Democrática \$400,000 for its activities abroad. Carrillo, *Memorias*, 604. The Mexicans had never recognized the Franco regime, and only agreed to establish diplomatic relations in 1977, once democratic elections had been called.
50. Amongst those who came to the PCE's assistance were the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Japan, and Romania, where its clandestine radio station was based.
51. See M. Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and their US Counterparts', *International Affairs*, 67/1 (1991), 33-63.
52. In 1985 Dieter Koniecki, the Ebert representative in Madrid, informed a Spanish parliamentary committee that during 1976-80 his foundation had invested over DM2.7m. in Spain. Another source estimates that Ebert spent DM4m. in the Iberian Peninsula in 1977 alone. Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Foreign Political Aid', 56.
53. Alvarez de Miranda, *Del 'contubernio'*, 89.
54. See *Tácito*, 28-9, 46, 193-5.
55. Note that these Church-state agreements were signed by the Spanish foreign minister and the Vatican Secretary of State, without the formal participation of the Spanish Church. Where the Catholic Church is concerned, therefore, conflicts with a domestic regime automatically acquire an external dimension: author's interview with Oreja, 1994; Areilza, *Diario*, 143.
56. See C. Huneus, *La Unión de Centro Democrático y la transición a la democracia en España* (Madrid, 1985), 175-90.
57. S. Carrillo, *El año de la peluca* (Barcelona, 1987), 37-8.
58. In his letter, the king claimed that in the recent elections the PSOE had received support from 'Willy Brandt, Venezuela and the other European Socialists', while the PCE had been financed 'by the usual means'. Juan Carlos attributed the PSOE's excellent performance partly to the fact that many had voted for them 'in the belief that through Socialism Spain might receive aid from such major European countries as Germany, or alternatively from countries such as Venezuela, for the revival of the Spanish economy': Alam, *Shah and I*, 552-4.
59. In his reply, the Shah displayed much greater caution than Juan Carlos, promising to 'convey my personal thoughts by word of mouth'. In his own letter, the king had thanked him for 'providing me with a speedy response to my appeal at a difficult moment for my country': Alam, *Shah and I*, 554, 552.